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Vickrey auctions are commonly used to elicit willingness to pay for new food products. 
This paper shows that in a multi-period context, it can be optimal to bid higher than the 
expected consumption value for new experience goods to obtain information about the 
quality of the goods. The degree of value uncertainty, the purchasing frequency, and 
expected future market prices affect both the expected value of the quality information 
and the weakly dominant bidding strategy in Vickrey auctions for new experience goods. 
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Information about the quality of food products is valuable for consumers. However, 
when consumers encounter a new product attribute, they are often uncertain about the 
quality of the product. In this paper, we investigate how uncertainty about quality affects 
the weakly dominant bidding strategy for new products in Vickrey auctions. 
A Vickrey auction is a private value auction in which the bidders submit sealed 
bids. The winner is the highest bidder and the price equals the second-highest bid. 
Vickrey showed that, in such an auction, it is a weakly dominant strategy for people to 
bid their willingness to pay (WTP) for the good on offer. People have an incentive to 
truthfully reveal their private preferences because the auction separates what they say 
from what they pay. Underbidding consumers risk foregoing a profitable purchase, 
whereas overbidding consumers risk making an unprofitable purchase. 
In the last 15 years, the Vickrey auction has been widely used to elicit WTP for 
food quality attributes (e.g., Alfnes and Rickertsen; Buhr et al.; Fox et al; Hayes et al.; 
Hoffman et al.; Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder; Lusk et al.; Melton et al.; Noussair, 
Robin, and Ruffieux; Roosen et al.; Rousu et al.; Rozan, Stenger, and Willinger; 
Umberger and Feuz). The appeal of the Vickrey auction for valuation work is that it is 
demand revealing in theory, relatively simple to explain, and has an endogenous market-
clearing price. In the typical valuation application of the Vickrey auction, two or more 
goods are offered and the participants bid on all goods simultaneously. To avoid income 
or substitution effects, one of the goods is randomly drawn as binding and sold to the 
highest bidder. The other goods are not sold. This winning restriction makes the 
valuations independent of each other, and hence, makes the simultaneous auction   4 
approach an incentive-compatible method for eliciting WTP for several competing goods 
from one group of participants. 
Product attributes are often divided into three categories: search, experience, and 
credence (Nelson; Darby and Karni). Search attributes are aspects of the product that can 
be determined by visual inspection, e.g., price and color. Experience attributes are 
aspects of the product that cannot be fully determined before the product is consumed, 
e.g., taste, tenderness, and juiciness. Credence attributes are aspects of the product that 
cannot be discerned by visual inspection or consumption, but rather consist of seller 
claims about the product. For food products, these claims are often linked to the 
production process, e.g., statements regarding the country-of-origin or claims that the 
product is GM-free, organically grown, or produced under conditions of humane animal 
treatment. In most countries, laws regulate the use of the most prominent credence 
attributes associated with food products. 
Vickrey auctions and other types of incentive-compatible experimental markets 
have been used to study all three types of product attributes. Examples include Hoffman 
et al., who investigated consumer WTP for new packaging for fresh beef (a search 
attribute), Umberger and Feuz, who investigated consumer WTP for beef flavor (an 
experience attribute), and Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux, who investigated consumer 
WTP for GM versus non-GM products (a credence attribute). 
Nelson defined experience goods as products whose quality cannot be fully 
determined before they are purchased. According to this definition, most food products 
can be considered as experience goods. The eating quality of a new brand or type of   5 
food, such as GM-foods, is only fully determined after purchase and consumption of the 
product. Search and credence attributes are often associated with experience attributes. 
This is illustrated clearly in Umberger and Feuz, who investigated consumer WTP for 
beef flavor (an experience attribute), but categorized the beef by its intramuscular fat 
content (a search attribute) and country of origin (a credence attribute). Consuming a 
product with experience attributes provides both a consumption value and information 
about the quality. This information is valuable because it can affect future purchase 
decisions and thereby increase future utility. 
Consumers who take part in an experimental auction market where new 
experience goods are offered might have incentives to bid higher than the expected 
consumption value to acquire information about the quality of the good. Shogren, List, 
and Hayes explored what they referred to as the “strikingly high price premia paid for 
new food products in lab valuation exercises” (p. 1016). They constructed an 
experimental design in which people bid in consecutive auctions over a two-week period 
for three goods that differed in terms of familiarity. Their result suggests that preference 
learning about unfamiliar goods explained the high bids, not the novelty of the lab 
experience. Their observations are consistent with the view that the bids for unfamiliar 
goods include an information value that reflects consumers’ desire to learn more about 
the goods. 
In this paper, we investigate how uncertainty about the quality of a new 
experience good affects the weakly dominant bidding strategy in Vickrey auctions. 
Furthermore, we investigate how elements outside the market experiment such as future   6 
market prices and frequency of purchase affect the deviation between WTP and expected 
consumption value. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, we set up a 
consumer model with two competing brands, one familiar incumbent brand and a new 
brand of unknown quality. Second, we investigate the consumers’ weakly dominant 
bidding strategy for the two brands in a Vickrey auction. Third, we illustrate the results 
with numerical examples. Finally, we conclude the paper. 
 
Consumer Model 
In response to empirical evidence of an order-of-entry and what he referred to as 
conventional wisdom in marketing, Schmalensee developed an economic model to 
account for the pioneering advantage for experience goods. The model’s basic premise is 
that there is an experiential asymmetry between incumbent and new brands. The 
consumers have tried and, therefore, know the quality of the incumbent brands. In 
contrast, the consumers have no experience with the new brands, and are unsure about 
the quality of these brands. This experiential asymmetry creates an advantage for the 
incumbent brand. See e.g., Kamins, Alpert, and Elliott; Niedrich and Swain; Villas-Boas 
for thorough discussions of the pioneering advantages in the marketing literature.  
We extend Schmalensee’s consumer model to include a small scale Vickrey 
auction conducted before the introduction of the new brand into the market. We assume 
that the auction results may affect the auction participants’ individual demand, but that 
the number of participants in the auction is so small that the results has no effect on the 
aggregated demand or on the producers pricing policies in later periods. This in mind, we   7 
conduct a partial analysis of the bidding strategies in the Vickrey auction assuming the 
future prices are exogenously given. 
Following Schmalensee, we set up a consumer model for the introduction of a 
new brand. Let us consider a narrowly defined product class, such that individual 
consumers can be sensibly modeled as using, at most, one brand in the class at any 
instant. It is assumed that the product is what Nelson called an “experience good”, so that 
the only way consumers can know the quality of the good is to purchase and try it. One 
trial is both necessary and sufficient to determine the quality of any single brand.
 The 
purchase decisions are made using purely private information; that is, consumers do not 
share information about product quality with each other.
1 There are two brands of the 
experience good available, one incumbent brand with a well-known quality, and a new 
brand with unknown quality. The value of the incumbent brand is  1 v . The consumers 
attach a probability of 0,1 π ∈ to the new brand being of low quality and a probability of 
( ) 1 π − to the new brand being of high quality. The value of the new brand is 2 2 L v v a = −  
in the case of low quality, and  2 2 H v v a = +  in the case of high quality, so that 
2 2 2 0 H L v v a − = > . The time between purchases is assumed constant and equal to one 
period, so that the trial of a new brand consumes the entire normal interpurchase time. 
The one-period discount rate is  0,1 r ∈ . All other factors remaining equal, a more 
frequent purchase implies a smaller value of r. Consumers are assumed to be risk neutral 
and to have infinite horizons.   8 
Let us assume that the market prices of the two brands are 1 p and  2 p , respectively. 
Further, we assume that  2 2 1 1 2 2 v a p v p v a p − − < − < + − . If the new brand is of low 
quality, its net consumption value is lower than that of the incumbent brand, whereas if 
the new brand is of high quality, its net consumption value is higher than that of the 
incumbent brand. These restrictions are consistent with Schmalensee, although he 
assumed that  2 2 1 v a v a v − < + = and used optimizing firms to find  2 1. p p <  
In any period, the consumer either knows or does not know the value of the new 
brand. If the consumer does know the value of the new brand, his or her decision 
problem is very simple—the consumer simply chooses the alternative with the highest 
net consumption value. The consumer should choose the new brand if the value of the 
new brand is  2 v a + , whereas he or she should choose the incumbent brand if the value 
of the new brand is  2 v a − . If the consumer does not know the value of the new brand, 
the expected net consumption value of the new brand is 
( ) ( )( ) 2 2 2 2 1 v a p v a p π π − − + − + − . In a single-period model, the consumer should try 
the new brand if and only if the expected net consumption value of the new brand is 
higher than the net consumption value of the incumbent brand, 
 
(1)    ( ) ( )( ) 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 v a p v a p v p π π − − + − + − > − . 
   9 
In a multi-period model, the consumers should try the new brand if and only if the 
expected net value of trying the new brand is higher than the net value of continuing to 
purchase the incumbent brand, 
 
(2)  ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 / 1 1 / 1 / v a p v p r v a p r r v p r r π π − − + − + − + − + > − +   
 
Alternatively, inequality (2) can be specified as, 
 
(3) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 / 1 v a p v p r v p v a p v a p π π π − + − − − > − − − − + − + −   
 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 2 1 1 1 / v a p v p r π − + − − −  is the expected information value from trying 
the new brand. It equals the current net value of buying a high quality new brand instead 
of the incumbent brand from the next period on, multiplied by the probability that the 
new brand is a high quality brand. The consumer should try the new brand only if the 
expected information value from doing so is larger than the expected net consumer loss 
from buying the new brand instead of the incumbent brand in this period, 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 v p v a p v a p π π − − − − + − + − . 
From inequality (2), we formulate the function  ( ) 1 2 F , , , , r a p p π , which is 
positive if and only if the consumer will try the new brand in the market. The function 
increases in all variables that increase the expected payoff of trying the new brand when 
it is introduced in the market.   10 
 
(4)




We differentiate F with respect to its elements to see if an increase in  1 , , , r a p π , and 
2 p make it more or less likely that the consumer will try the new brand in the market. 
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The probability of trying the new brand is decreasing inπ and r, increasing in a for all 
products that are purchased on a regular basis, increasing in the price of the substitute 
(the incumbent brand), and decreasing in its own price. An increase in π  will decrease 
the expected payoff from trying the new brand by decreasing the expected consumption   11 
value and decreasing the expected information value. An increase in r will decrease the 
value of future payoffs and thereby decrease the expected information value. An increase 
in a will increase the expected information value, but the effect on the expected 
consumption value depends on the value of π . If  0.5 π < , then an increase in a will have 
a positive effect on the expected consumption value, whereas if  0.5 π > , then an increase 
in a will have a negative effect on the expected consumption value. The total effect of an 
increase in a is positive for all products that are purchased on a regular basis and not very 
likely to be of low quality. For example, for  0.1 r = , the derivative of F with respect to a 
is positive if  0.91 π ≤ . The own- and cross-price effects are negative and positive, 
respectively, as expected. 
 
Vickrey Auction 
If the consumers’ first encounter with the new brand is in a Vickrey auction before its 
introduction into the market, the decision problem is more complicated. The expected 
information value depends on what the consumers plan to do if they do not know the 
quality when the new brand is introduced in the market. 
For simplicity, let us assume that the auction takes one period, and that 
participants in that period can buy only the product in the auction. In other words, there 
are no outside options in the auction period. The bidders’ optimal strategy is to bid so 
that they maximize the discounted expected net consumption value of the auction and all 
future periods, EV, given that, in the future, consumers will try to maximize the 
discounted net consumption value of all future periods. For the incumbent brand with a   12 
known quality, we find the weakly dominant bidding strategy by solving the following 
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If  1 1
A Bid p > , then the consumer buys the incumbent brand in the auction, otherwise he 
or she does not. Either way, the consumer gains no new information about the quality of 
the new brand. His or her maximization problem in the next period is unchanged. 
For the new brand of unknown quality, we find the weakly dominant bidding 
strategy by solving the following maximization problem with respect to  2 Bid : 
 
(12)  ( )
( )( )
2
2 2 1 1
2
2
2 2 2 2
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  − − + − = 
> 
+ − + − + + −  
,   13 
 
where S is given in equation (11). If  2 2
A Bid p > , then the consumer buys the new brand 
in the auction, otherwise he or she does not. If the consumer does not buy the new brand 
in the auction, he or she gains no new information about the quality of the new brand. 
His or her maximization problem in the next period is unchanged. If he or she buys the 
new brand, the quality of the brand is revealed, and, in the next period, the consumer will 
choose the alternative with the highest quality. With a probability of π , the alternative 
with the highest quality will be the incumbent brand, and with a probability of ( ) 1 π − the 
alternative with the highest quality will be the new brand. 
In Vickrey auctions, “the optimal strategy for each bidder…will obviously be to 
make his bid equal…to that price at which he would be on the margin of indifference as 
to whether he obtains the article or not” (Vickrey, p. 20). We will use this feature of the 
Vickrey auction to solve the two maximization problems. 
To maximize equation (10) and find the optimal bid for the incumbent brand, we 
assume that the bidders are indifferent about winning the auction or not when  1 1
A Bid p = , 
 
(13)  1 1 1 1 v Bid S = S Bid v − + ⇔ = .  
 
The weakly dominant strategy is to bid the consumption value of the incumbent brand. 
The outcome of the auction for the incumbent brand has no effect on what will happen in 
the market, so S cancels out. The multi-period solution equals the single-period solution.   14 
There is no new information to be gained from consuming the incumbent brand, and, 
therefore, there is no information value associated with the incumbent brand. In addition, 
we can see that the dominant bidding strategy for the incumbent brand is independent of 
1 , , , r a p π , and 2 p . 
To maximize equation (12) and find the optimal bid for the new brand, we 
assume that the bidders are indifferent about winning the auction or not when 
2 2
A Bid p = , 
   
(14) 
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2 1 1 2 2 2
2 ( )/ 1 2 ( )/
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The weakly dominant strategy in the auction for the new brand depends on S. This means 
that the dominant strategy in the auction for the new brand depends on what the 
consumers plan to do if they do not know the quality of the new brand when it is released 
into the market. 
First, let us assume that  1 1 ( )/ S v p r = − , so that the consumer would stay with the 
incumbent brand if he or she did not know the quality of the new brand. This gives the 
following dominant bidding strategy for the new brand, 
 
(15)  ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 ( ) / Bid v a v a v a p v p r π π π = − + − + + − + − − −    15 
 
The optimal bid equals the expected consumption value plus the expected information 
value. In this case, the expected information value is the value of buying a high quality  
new brand instead of the incumbent brand, from the next period on, 
( ) 2 2 1 1 ( ) / v a p v p r + − − − , multiplied by the probability that the new brand is of high 
quality,( ) 1 π − . 
Second, let us assume that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 2 2 1 1 2 2 /(1 ) / (1 ) 1 / S v a p r v p r r v a p r π π = − − + + − + + − + − , so that the 
consumer would try the new brand in the market. This gives the following dominant 
bidding strategy for the new brand, 
 
(16)  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 /(1 ) Bid v a v a v p v a p r π π π = − + − + + − − − − +  
 
The optimal bid equals the expected consumption value plus the expected information 
value. In this case, the expected information value is the current value of buying the 
incumbent brand instead of the new brand if the new brand is of low quality, in the next 
period,  ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 2 /(1 ) v p v a p r − − − − + , multiplied by the probability that the new brand 
is of low quality,π . 
It is straightforward to show that if 1 1 2 2 v p v a p − = − + ,  1 1 2 2 v p v a p − = + + , 
0 a = ,  1 r = ,  0 π = , or  1 π = , there would not be any information value in trying the 
new brand, and the weakly dominant bidding strategy would be equal to the expected   16 
consumption value. In addition, it is straightforward to show that the two bidding 
strategies for the new brand, (15) and (16), give the same weakly dominant bidding 
strategy when  ( ) 1 2 F , , , , 0 r a p p π = , i.e., when the consumers are indifferent about testing 
or not testing the new brand in the market. Hence, the optimal bid for the new brand is a 
continuous function of the consumption values ( ) 1 2 , , v v a , the market prices ( ) 1 2 , p p , the 
probabilities( ) ,1 π π − , and the discounting factor r. Furthermore, it can be shown that 
the highest expected value for the new brand, 2H v , constitutes an upper limit and the 
expected consumption value,  ( ) ( )( ) 2 2 1 v a v a π π − + − + , constitutes a lower limit for 
the optimal bid for the new brand. Hence, it will never be optimal to bid higher 
than 2 v a + or lower than ( ) ( )( ) 2 2 1 v a v a π π − + − + . 
We differentiate the optimal bid function with respect to 1 , , , r a p π , and 2 p  to 
investigate how the optimal bid for the new brand is affected by changes in the 
probability of the brand being low quality, the discounting factor, the valuation spread 
for the new brand, the market price of the incumbent brand, and the market price of the 
new brand, respectively. Keeping in mind our initial assumptions for 1 , , , r a p π , and 2 p , 
we obtain the following results for a change in π , 
 
(17)  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
2 / 0 F 0 2
2 / 1 0 F > 0
a v p v a p r if Bid
a v p v a p r if 
δ
δπ
 − + − − + − < ≤  = 
− + − − − − + <  
. 
   17 
The expected consumption value is decreasing in π , whereas the expected information 
value is increasing in π  as long as  ( ) 1 2 F , , , , 0 r a p p π > . The total effect of an increase in 
π is a decrease in the optimal bid, independent of what the consumer plans to do if he or 
she does not win the auction. 
Equation (18) shows the effect of a marginal increase in the discounting factor, 
 
(18) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 1 2 2
2
2 2 1 1
1 / 0 F 0 2
/ 1 0 F 0
v p v a p r if Bid
r v a p v p r if
π δ
δ π
 − − − + − < ≤  = 
− − − − + < >  
. 
 
Increasing the discounting factor r is the same as reducing the purchase frequency. This 
has no effect on the expected consumption value, but it decreases the information value 
through reducing the current value of future payoffs. An increase in r decreases the 
optimal bid. 
Equation (19) shows the effect of a marginal increase in the valuation spread for 
the new brand, 
 
(19)   ( )
( ) ( )
1 (1 2 ) / F 0 2
1 (1 2 ) / 1 F 0
r r if Bid
r r if a
π π δ
π π δ
− + − ≤   =  − + − + >  
. 
 
For products bought very seldom and with very large probabilities of being low quality, 
the optimal bid decreases as a increases. For other products, the optimal bid increases 
when a increases. For example, for  0.1 r = , the derivative of 2 Bid with respect to a is   18 
positive if  0.91 π ≤ . The effect of change in a is strongest when the consumer does not 
plan to try the new brand in the market. 
Equation (20) shows the effect of a marginal increase in the market price of the 
incumbent brand, 
 
(20)   ( )
( ) 1
1 / 0 F 0 2





− > ≤   = − + < >  
. 
 
The market price of the incumbent brand does not affect the expected consumption value 
of the new brand, and the total effect of the change in 1 p is a result of  a change in the 
expected information value. If the consumer does not plan to try the new brand in the 
market, the expected information value and the optimal bid for the new brand increase as 
the market price of the incumbent brand increases. However, if the consumer does plan 
to try the new brand in the market, the expected information value and the optimal bid 
for the new brand decrease as the market price of the incumbent brand increases. The 
effect of 1 p on the expected information value occurs through a change in the net 
consumption value of the incumbent brand,  1 1 v p − . A marginal increase in 1 v would have 
had the opposite effect of the marginal increase in 1 p discussed here. 
Equation (21) shows the effect of a marginal increase in the market price of the 
new brand, 
   19 
(21)   ( )
( ) 2
1 / 0 F 0 2





− − < ≤   =  + > >  
. 
 
The expected future market price of the new brand does not affect the expected 
consumption value of the new brand, and the effect of the change in  2 p is a change in the 
expected information value. If the consumer does not plan to try the new brand in the 
market, the expected information value and the optimal bid for the new brand decrease as 
the market price of the new brand increases. However, if the consumer does plan to try 
the new brand in the market, the expected information value and the optimal bid for the 
new brand increase as the market price of the new brand increases. 
 
Numerical examples 
To illustrate how the optimal bid for the new brand changes with 1 , , , r a p π , and 2 p , we 
present four figures. In all four figures,π varies from 0 to 1, and one of the other 
variables takes several values. The basic model included in all four figures is  1 1.0 v = , 
2 0.8 v = ,  0.2 a = ,  1 0.6 p = ,  2 0.4 p = , 0.1 r = , and  0.2 a = . 
From figure 1 (and figures 2, 3, and 4), we can see that an increase in π decreases 
the weakly dominant bidding strategy. However, the expected information value 
increases whenπ increases as long as π is not so larger that consumers will not try the 
product in the market. This is consistent with equation (17). 
Figure 1 illustrates how an increase in r from 0.1 to 0.2 and to 0.3 affects the 
optimal bid. We can see that an increase in the discounting factor r decreases the optimal   20 
bid. Increasing r has no effect on the expected consumption value, but it decreases the 
information value by reducing the current value of future payoffs. This is consistent with 
equation (18). 
Figure 2 illustrates how a change in a from 0.2 to 0.3 affects the optimal bid. 
When a equals 0.2, then  2 0.6 L v =  and  2 1.0 H v = , and when a equals 0.3, then  2 0.5 L v =  
and  2 1.1 H v = . We can see that an increase in a increases the slope of the expected 
consumption value curve. Furthermore, the increase in a increases the expected 
information value from trying the new brand. In other words, when a increases, the 
difference between the optimal bid and the expected consumption value increases. These 
results are consistent with equation (19). 
Figure 3 illustrates how a change in 1 p from 0.6 to 0.5 and to 0.7 affects the 
optimal bid. We can see that an increase in 1 p increases the optimal bid if the consumer 
does not plan to try the new brand in the market. However, if the consumer does plan to 
try the new brand in the market, the optimal bid decreases when the value of the 
incumbent brand increases. These results are consistent with equation (20). 
Figure 4 illustrates how a change in 2 p from 0.4 to 0.3 and to 0.5 affects the 
optimal bid. We can see that an increase in 2 p decreases the optimal bid if the consumer 
does not plan to try the new brand in the market. However, if the consumer does plan to 
try the new brand in the market, the optimal bid decreases when the value of the 
incumbent brand increases. If  2 p had been increased to 0.6, there would have been no   21 
expected information value and the optimal bid curve would have been equal to the 




In Vickrey auctions for a new experience good, it is optimal to bid higher than the 
expected consumption value to obtain information about the quality of the good. The 
degree of value uncertainty, the purchasing frequency, and expected future market prices 
all affect the value of the quality information and the thereby the consumers’ WTP for 
the new product. The weakly dominant strategy discussed in this paper is consistent with 
Vickrey’s optimal bidding results, however a part of the WTP is based on a potential 
surplus that be gained in future periods. It is also important to notice that the information 
value is equally important in all incentive-compatible methods for eliciting WTP for 
products with unknown quality. 
The predictions of the model is consistent with the experimental results in 
Shogren, List, and Hayes, who explored what they referred to as the strikingly high price 
premia paid for new food products in lab valuation exercises. They found that auction 
participants’ WTP for familiar goods were unaffected by trying the good, while the WTP 
for unfamiliar goods were reduced after the consumers had tried them. The reduction in 
WTP after the consumers had tried the unfamiliar good can be interpreted as a reduction 
in the information value from further testing of the good.     22 
Researchers cannot affect the valuation of the incumbent brands, the expected 
future market prices, or the purchasing frequency, but they can significantly reduce the 
uncertainty about the quality of the new brand. If the consumers know the quality with 
certainty, the weakly dominant bidding strategy is to bid the expected consumption value 
of the new good. Therefore, if the quality uncertainty is not an important part of an 
experimental market study, it might be wise to allow the consumers to test the product 
before the market experiment. This will alleviate the uncertainty about the quality and 
thereby reduce the importance of elements outside of the experiment, such as the 
expected future market prices, or the purchasing frequency.    23 
Footnotes 
 
1 Consumers might not share information because it is too costly to search for other 
consumers of the product or because the reports of other consumers are unreliable. That 
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Figure 4. Effect of changes in 2 p on the optimal bid for a new experience good 